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Lines of Thought

Defending Compromise

by Michael Fischer

E

mory University President James Wagner’s column (“As American
as . . . Compromise”) for the Winter 2013 issue of Emory Magazine
defends compromise as essential to the founding and sustaining of
the American political system.1 Compromise needs defending, Wagner
argues, because polarization is jeopardizing the ability of national
political leaders to deal with such urgent issues as “our country’s fiscal
conundrums.” As a citizen, Wagner advocates compromise as a way
past legislative paralysis. As a university president, Wagner is reminding
his readers—primarily alumni and parents—that compromise is alive
and well at the university that he leads. What Wagner calls “the messy
inefficiency of university life,” Emory University included, results from
welcoming different points of view and working through them to reach
decisions that benefit the institution as a whole. In a university, Wagner
suggests, compromise at once facilitates the decision-making process and
strengthens its outcomes. Even as Emory, like other universities, faces
limited resources and competing visions of what should be done with
them, Wagner concludes, “I am grateful that we have at our disposal the
rich tools of compromise that help us achieve our most noble goals.”
Wagner cites as a positive historical example of compromise the agreement at the 1787 Constitutional Convention that allowed three-fifths
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of a state’s slave population to count toward determining the number
of that state’s representatives in the newly created Congress. Southern
delegates, Wagner notes, had wanted to count the whole slave population, whereas Northern delegates did not want to count slaves at all. To
resolve this disagreement, the two sides set aside their original positions
and settled on something in between, enabling the new Constitution
and country to take shape.
The president’s column in an alumni magazine is not a genre usually
associated with controversy. But Wagner’s piece quickly made national
news. Readers were furious that he had cited this compromise without
deploring the slavery that it kept intact and inscribed in the inaugural
United States Constitution. Their outcry triggered the apology from
Wagner that now precedes this column on the magazine website:
A number of people have raised questions regarding part of my essay
in the most recent issue of Emory Magazine. Certainly, I do not consider
slavery anything but heinous, repulsive, repugnant, and inhuman. I should
have stated that clearly in my essay. I am sorry for the hurt caused by not
communicating more clearly my own beliefs. To those hurt or confused
by my clumsiness and insensitivity, please forgive me.

Although most readers (rightly, in my opinion) accepted this apology,
the damage had been done, if not to the university’s reputation or to
Wagner’s presidency then at least to his defense of compromise, which
got lost in the ensuring clamor.
Wagner’s article and the tumult it occasioned say much about attitudes toward compromise in contemporary American life. Like Wagner,
many observers feel that unprecedented polarization is hurting the
country. While legislators squabble, the climate burns, unemployment
persists, and bridges and highways crumble. Pick any urgent issue, and
chances are that the national legislative stalemate is exacerbating it.
With ideological intransigence and political gridlock identified as the
problem, compromise is frequently put forth as the remedy. But when
a specific compromise is proposed, even the most ardent proponents
of compromise recoil and the original logjam reestablishes itself, the
failure to arrive at an agreement creating additional opportunities for
mutual recrimination and resentment. Even when an often last-minute
compromise is achieved, it occasions disappointment, not celebration. A
compromise has thus come to suggest not every faction benefiting, but
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all sides feeling shortchanged, dissatisfied, and more determined than
ever that next time they will vanquish, not appease, their adversaries.
I want here to explore why compromise functions as what Avishai
Margalit calls a “boo-hurrah” concept: something that we cheer in
theory as evidence of cooperation and generosity but often disparage
in practice as selling out and spinelessness.2 Margalit’s On Compromise
and Rotten Compromises is one of the best recent philosophical treatments
of compromise, especially its role in resolving or prolonging international disputes. In The Spirit of Compromise: Why Governing Demands It
and Campaigning Undermines It, political scientists Amy Gutmann and
Dennis Thompson focus on the fractious United States Congress and the
political pressures that discourage elected officials from compromising.3
Robert Mnookin’s Bargaining with the Devil: When to Negotiate, When to
Fight adds still more disputes to the mix—business, family, and employment conflicts—that individuals face every day.4 The chair of Harvard
Law School’s Program on Negotiation, Mnookin probes our personal
resistance to negotiating and compromising with our adversaries. Finally,
I introduce literature and the other arts as underutilized resources in
strengthening our fitful receptivity to compromise and sustaining the
social hope that, I argue, trust in compromise embodies.
Margalit labels the so-called Three-Fifths Compromise, the example
upheld by Wagner in his Emory Magazine column, a “rotten” compromise:
an agreement that should not have been entered into even though it
secured peace between the North and the South and enabled a new
country to gel. According to Margalit, rotten compromises ensure peace
but at the expense of justice, which in this case demanded an end to
the systematically inhuman, cruel, and barbarous institution of slavery.
Margalit concedes that the establishment of the union eventually may
have done more to undermine slavery than to perpetuate it. But the
framers of the Constitution could not have predicted this outcome.
They signed on to this agreement realizing that it was probably going
to perpetuate slavery for at least another generation and maybe even
longer, a price that Margalit feels they should not have been willing to
pay even if it brought about concord between opposed factions.
For Margalit, rotten compromises are the exception rather than the
rule. The grounds for rejecting rotten compromises center on their
establishing or maintaining social arrangements as systematically dehumanizing as slavery, with its “crimes against humanity” (p. 67). One
other rotten compromise that Margalit mentions is the 1938 Munich
agreement with Hitler, which Margalit describes as “a pact with radical

590

Philosophy and Literature

evil, evil as an assault on morality itself” (p. 22). By making the test of
rotten compromises so strict, Margalit wants to make it harder, not easier,
for us to reject compromising, a process that he, like Wagner, regards
as necessary to democratic political life. More positively, he means to
encourage openness to particular compromises as agreements to be
evaluated on their merits, case by case, not rejected out of hand. His
encouragement of compromising leads him to go so far as to defend
the so-called “Blood for Trucks” deal that Adolf Eichmann offered the
Allies, which promised to save the lives of a million Hungarian Jews
in exchange for Nazi Germany receiving ten thousand trucks for civilian use. Such a deal, which the Allies rejected for strategic reasons,
approaches moral rottenness but rises above it presumably because its
impact on the Nazi government would have been negligible, its benefit
to the victims of Nazism huge.
In shoring up our receptivity to compromise, Margalit is opposing
what he calls sectarianism, which rejects all compromises as rotten. For
him, sectarianism describes both a way of dealing with others and a state
of mind. In dealing with others, the sectarian would rather “split the
party than split the difference” (p. 148): that is, sectarians would rather
keep the cohort of true believers pure than expand it by, say, treating
some criteria for membership as optional or less important than others.
From a sectarian point of view, integrity suggests unwavering ideological commitment. Over time, sectarians hope, a shrinking but steadfast
group will have more influence than an opportunistically expanding
one. “The heresy of today,” however weak in numbers, might still be the
“orthodoxy of tomorrow,” but “this will happen by massive conversion,
not by messy compromise” (p. 152).
As a state of mind, sectarianism stays in the “grip of the idea of the
holy” (p. 24) whether or not its underlying worldview is religious. Margalit
explains that “the holy is not negotiable, let alone subject to compromise” (p. 24). A sacred commitment can only be tenaciously upheld,
not waived, revisited, or revised in dialogue with others. The sectarian
frame of mind always feels under siege in a hostile world. Sectarians
demonize outsiders as enemies and experience every compromise with
“them” as “a sellout, a capitulation, a betrayal of the cause” (p. 149).
Even seemingly minor concessions to one’s adversaries are resisted as
steps on a slippery slope to defeat. For sectarians, every disagreement
thus becomes a win-or-lose showdown with nonnegotiable, sacred first
principles at stake. In a word, “sectarians are haters”: “They hate not
just the error but the ones who err” (p. 162), the adversaries whose
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departures from doctrine get reduced to moral failings in need of
recantation or punishment.
By repudiating all compromises, sectarians reject the possibility of
what Margalit calls sanguine compromises. A sanguine compromise
confers legitimacy on the point of view of the other side by meeting
it halfway. Parties to a sanguine compromise may even refrain from
driving as hard a bargain as they could, out of respect for an ongoing
relationship with the other side that they want to protect. Empathy
plays a key role in sanguine compromises, as each side acknowledges
the circumstances, needs, and motives of the other. Margalit notes how,
in international political negotiations, recognizing the legitimacy of the
other side—acknowledging it as an elected entity, for example, and not
dismissing it as a terrorist organization—can be as difficult as reaching
an agreement with it. But moving from winner-take-all competition to
both-sides-belong-at-the-table cooperation requires the mutual respect
and trust signaled by deeming the other side worthy of collaboration.
In the dialogue between adversaries that results, Margalit points out
how hardliners sometimes block progress by measuring proposed concessions not against the status quo but against a dream that they refuse to
give up: the dream of having it all, without having to take into account
the perspective of the other side. A monetary settlement might be more
than one currently has, yet less than what one thinks in an ideal world
one deserves, and be rejected by hardliners on that basis. This ideal
world keeps alive the dream of domination over one’s adversaries or
the wish that they would go away once and for all. Empathy again is
required to help us understand that others regard their needs exactly
as we regard ours: as critical to their very survival and identity, not as
unrealistic demands that they should discard because they get in our
way. At their best, sanguine compromises are freely entered into out
of respect for the other’s point of view. A coerced concession isn’t a
compromise but begrudging capitulation, a resented pause in a conflict
that will one day resume.
Margalit doesn’t clarify his use of “sanguine,” but here is what I think
people who enter into these compromises are sanguine about: sharing
the world with people who differ from them and benefiting from ongoing
relationships and long-term commitments that encourage disagreement,
independent thinking, and dissent. Unlike sectarians, parties to a sanguine compromise trust that the tolerance, respect, and concessions they
extend to others will be reciprocated, that cutthroat competition can give
way to cooperation, and that dialogue with others offers opportunities
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for growth for everyone involved. Like Wagner in his Emory Magazine
column, Margalit believes that compromise “breathes life into democracy” (p. 151). He steers us away from rotten international compromises
because they instantiate or sustain antidemocratic hatreds. He opposes
the sectarian rejection of all compromises for much the same reason.
For him, our interest in getting along with others should not override
our commitment to justice. But we must not construe justice narrowly
as something for our group alone. Rejecting a compromise should be a
last resort carefully arrived at, not a kneejerk reaction to disagreement.
On Compromise and Rotten Compromises is a wise, consistently thoughtprovoking book and an indispensable starting point for anyone thinking
about ambivalence toward compromise. Although Margalit predicates
democracy on compromise, he stops short of specifying the institutional
arrangements and political processes that nurture or stifle the willingness
to compromise in a democracy. That task is taken up by Amy Gutmann
and Dennis Thompson in The Spirit of Compromise: Why Governing Demands
It and Campaigning Undermines It, which looks at the United States
Congress, an institution that Gutmann and Thompson also think is
stymied by finger pointing, deep distrust, and unprecedented acrimony.
Like Wagner and Margalit, Gutmann and Thompson emphasize the
necessity of compromise in democracies, which value disagreement and
welcome different points of view. Even if a landslide election were to
bring the Senate, House of Representatives, and White House under the
control of one party, the need for compromise would persist because
of inevitable differences within the dominant party. In a democracy,
even a powerful national leader—an arm-twisting Lyndon Baines
Johnson, a savvy Abraham Lincoln, a persuasive Ronald Reagan—still
has to find receptive partners from the other side and meet them half
way. Compromise will thus always be the “artistry of democracy” (SC,
p. 204) and “there is no escape from compromise” (SC, p. 20) as an
indispensable precondition of achieving legislative change. Without
trade-offs, concessions, and mutual accommodation to bridge divergent
perspectives, legislating degenerates into grandstanding gestures and
ineffectual rhetoric. Gutmann and Thompson stress that the status quo
is the chief beneficiary of the gridlock that results. Blocking improvements, even in the name of greater change or ideological consistency,
leaves things as they are.
Although compromise will always be essential to getting things done,
Gutmann and Thompson show that specific compromises remain
vulnerable to second-guessing and disappointment, especially when
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measured against freestanding solutions abstracted from the tangled
political realities that make negotiation necessary in the first place. In
practice, compromises are “path-dependent”: “How a compromise is
reached affects how it is valued” (SC, p. 36). The process of arriving
at an agreement will never be perfectly transparent, inclusive, and
paced. Every perceived procedural lapse stays in play, ready to be used
to question the outcome that results. Exacerbating the vulnerability of
compromises, “the deep and persistent disagreement” (SC, p. 35) that
polarizes contemporary American politics can make the search for common ground futile. “Win-win” solutions are rare; painful concessions
much more common. In such a polarized environment, the best that
can be achieved in a compromise—and it may still be a step forward—
resembles a patchwork or grab bag of expedient half measures instead
of a coherent resolution arising from a (nonexistent) unified point of
view. Finally, uncertainty disturbs the process of compromising from
beginning to end, making the compromise that results even easier to
criticize after the fact. Parties to a compromise can never know if they
should have tried a different tactic at the outset or held out for more
at the end. They are always haunted by the feeling that the outcome
would have been better if they had been more forceful or their adversaries less obstinate.
According to Gutmann and Thompson, political campaigns exploit
the ineluctable vulnerability of compromises. Unlike collaborating on
legislation, political campaigns are zero-sum, winner-take-all battles.
They reward what Gutmann and Thompson call the uncompromising
mindset, which they define in much the same way as Margalit characterizes sectarianism. Campaigns reinforce a candidate’s readiness to draw
a stark contrast between her position and her opponent’s, even when
it means disparaging her adversary’s motives, exaggerating the differences between them, and taking inflexible, attention-getting stands
(no new taxes, no cuts to a favored program, etc.) that make flexibility
and open-mindedness look wishy-washy by comparison. In a campaign,
short-term gains override longer-term relationships. Candidates listen to
their opponents not for overtures they can reciprocate but weaknesses
they can exploit.
Gutmann and Thompson argue that for a variety of reasons, campaigning in contemporary American politics never stops. Congressional
representatives and senators are always looking back at the last election
or ahead to the next one, at great cost to their ability to govern. In gerrymandered House districts controlled by one party, the next election
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means the next primary—when they know they will be challenged by
insurgent opponents who will hold their achievements against them
exactly because these legislative accomplishments required compromise.
In primaries, candidates can’t win without staking out extreme positions.5
In office, however, elected officials cannot get anything done without
being more flexible and thereby risking, in the next election, criticism
for “flip-flopping.” Aided by rules like the filibuster, which give disproportionate power to minority voices, obstructing change turns out to
be politically smarter and more effective than making the concessions
necessary to achieving change. A “cascade of intransigence” (SC, p. 91)
results, overflowing from campaign debates to legislative committees and
blocking every effort to move forward. Anticipating gridlock, legislators
exchange proposals that have no chance of passing but that play to the
base that will be judging them in the next election.
Gutmann and Thompson want to curb endless campaigning or, what
comes to the same thing, to create more space for governing. For them,
spurred on by unchecked campaigning, the uncompromising mindset
resembles “an invasive species that spreads beyond its natural habitat as
it roams from the campaign to the government” (SC, p. 22). Gutmann
and Thompson offer several promising specific measures for limiting
campaigning, including imposing moratoriums on fund-raising, reforming primaries, improving media coverage, and strengthening “the kind
of cognitive and civic education that teaches not only how to tell fact
from fiction but also how to engage with those with whom one disagrees”
(SC, p. 195). These proposals round out a well-argued, timely book.
Although Gutmann and Thompson detect some inconsistencies
in Margalit’s argument, they rightly call On Compromise and Rotten
Compromises “the best recent attempt to distinguish acceptable from
unacceptable compromises” (SC, p. 78). I think the similarities between
these two books overshadow their occasional differences. In addition
to complementing one another, the two books converge in defending the necessity of compromise in democratic decision-making while
acknowledging the vulnerability of individual compromises to sectarian
rejection. Sectarian intransigence finds reinforcement not only in endless campaigning but also in the complexity of the issues that Congress
takes up. These issues are rarely clear-cut and always susceptible to
moral judgment. As Gutmann and Thompson point out, “Few material
interests in democratic politics, and almost no important ones, present
themselves unattached to moral principles” (SC, p. 76). Even seemingly
minor legislative disputes can be reframed as jeopardizing or protecting
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“core principles of justice” (SC, p. 76). In political debates, what Margalit
calls the holy is never far away, threatening reconciliation and even
dialogue with its nonnegotiable imperatives.
In Bargaining with the Devil: When to Negotiate, When to Fight, Robert
Mnookin focuses on how we stigmatize our adversaries as “devils” when
we think they jeopardize that which we hold sacred. These “devils” touch
off an almost visceral, moral revulsion in us, maybe because we feel
they intentionally harmed us in the past and will do so again, if given
the chance, in the future. Even talking with these adversaries, let alone
negotiating or compromising with them, feels as if it undermines our
integrity and betrays something deep inside our selves, no matter how
much the compromise might make practical sense.
Mnookin wants to honor our moral, intuitive resistance to bargaining
with these enemies while subjecting that resistance to rigorous scrutiny.
Like Margalit, Mnookin resists saying that we should always negotiate
and never fight. Mnookin defends, for example, President George W.
Bush’s decision not to negotiate with the Taliban after September 11;
the Soviet Jewish dissident Natan Sharansky’s refusal to negotiate with
the KGB; and Winston Churchill’s May 1940 decision not to negotiate
with Hitler. But he cautions against using these examples to justify the
categorical rejection of negotiation. Even in the most seemingly morally
one-sided disputes, the possibility persists that an aggrieved person’s
judgment could be clouded by anger, warped by the longing for revenge,
or distorted by the readiness to demonize and distrust others because
they disagree with us.
Mnookin wants the choice between negotiating and fighting to be
a difficult decision, not a foregone conclusion arrived at by dogmatic
obstinacy or uncritical appeasement. His examples of people agonizing
over this decision include an American businessman who feels betrayed
by his Japanese partner; an angry spouse facing child custody and support disputes in an acrimonious divorce; embittered symphony musicians contemplating the next contract negotiation after a costly strike
and disappointing settlement; and adult children at odds over a family
vacation home that they have inherited. These people struggle with
determining whether their initial, perhaps ongoing, impulse to fight is
morally called for or the result of misguided stubbornness.
In considering these specific cases, although he can defend the occasional decision to fight, Mnookin puts the burden of proof on those
who would refuse to negotiate with their antagonists. The hero of his
book is Nelson Mandela, who had every reason not to negotiate with
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the ruling National Party: twenty-three years of unjust imprisonment
for treason; pressure from his followers, his political base, to retaliate
and strike back, even violently, as soon as they had a chance; and lack
of any personal connection to President F. W. de Klerk, the adversary
with whom he had to negotiate. Mnookin argues that Mandela’s decision to bargain with his enemies turned out to be more successful than
violent resistance could ever have been. He calls Mandela one of the
best negotiators of the twentieth century because he struck the right
balance between pragmatic openness and principled assertion, between
empathic understanding of other points of view and forceful articulation
of his own. Mnookin concludes, “Mandela was a negotiator to whom one
could make concessions and yet maintain one’s self-respect. Mandela
worked hard to establish and maintain a personal, human connection
with Afrikaner leaders whose life experiences and attitudes were radically different from his own. These leaders came to see that Mandela
really believed in racial reconciliation. They saw that his vision for South
Africa included them” (BD, p. 135).
Although Mandela made mistakes, his exceptional judgment, courage,
and insight into others guided him through some challenging negotiations, while going to war against his adversaries remained a constant
temptation. For those struggling with the devils in their own everyday
lives—the businessman, divorced woman, and symphony union members
mentioned earlier—Mnookin offers this rule of thumb:
In deciding whether to enter into negotiations with a despised adversary,
you can guard against a hasty rejection based simply on your gut instincts
by discussing the matter with a colleague who disagrees. Being pushed
to give reasons for your inclinations may sometimes lead you to change
your mind. And even when it doesn’t, it will force you think through
more rationally which course of action makes the most sense. (BD, p. 103)

This advice is helpful, but it is also limited. The Mandelas of this world
have already internalized this recommendation, whereas the sectarians
of the world reject it out of hand. They remain in the grip of what one
San Francisco Symphony musician, quoted by Mnookin, astutely calls
the “fear of empathizing”: the “fear of hearing somebody else’s side.
Fear that it is going to make it harder for them to disagree” (BD, p.
209). This is the deep-seated distress that, as we have seen, militates
against compromising, energizes many political campaigns, and seals
off rotten regimes.
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Here is where I think literature and the other arts can come into
play: as counterweights to this “fear of empathizing,” to which anyone,
of course, can succumb. Sectarianism, narcissistic and self-promotional
campaigning, and intolerance can crop up anywhere—in the workplace
as well as in political campaigns. In claiming a role for literature in
strengthening consideration for other points of view, I specifically have
in mind Martha Nussbaum’s recent work, especially Not for Profit: Why
Democracy Needs the Humanities, which argues that the arts and humanities cultivate the qualities that healthy democracies depend on: among
them, empathy, respect for differences, and appreciation of complexity.6
Nussbaum’s defense of literature can be taken further by looking
more closely at how empathy can find traction in compromises and
the collaborative decision-making that compromises enable. In David F.
Elmer’s remarkable The Poetics of Consent: Collective Decision Making and
the “Iliad,” a work of literature—here, the Iliad—shows how attentiveness
to other points of view, debate, and compromise can energize collective decision-making.7 The confidence invested in the community and
the emphasis placed on cooperation are so powerful in the Iliad that a
crisis results when a leader, Agamemnon, acts unilaterally and violates
the expectation that consensus must be achieved—the consent of others
secured—before proposals get implemented. In Elmer’s account, even
the Olympian gods, Zeus included, exhibit a disposition to yield to the
collective wisdom of their group. They make crucial decisions by debating, negotiating with one another, and accommodating different views,
initiating a process, Elmer argues, that extends to the reception of the
Iliad itself. The performance of the poem at public festivals made the
audience partly responsible for the tradition that individual recitations
of the poem intended to carry on. Reconciling different versions of the
poem engaged the community in the collaborative decision-making that
the poem itself values.
Elmer starts out on a path other critics might follow by studying scenes
of cooperation as well as conflict in works of literature. (Athena’s bargaining with the Furies in the Oresteia after the jury verdict has gone against
them, for example, would be a good place to extend Elmer’s work.)
In addition, Elmer’s focus on the public reception of the Iliad points
to another promising line of inquiry: how our social experience of the
arts can reinforce their contributions to democratic decision-making.
The wide-ranging books that I have been discussing overlook one kind
of disagreement: aesthetic disputes, or disagreements over the value of
works of art. Immanuel Kant set the stage for this discussion when he
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famously argued in the Critique of Judgment that in aesthetic judgments,
we speak with a “universal voice.”8 When someone calls something
beautiful, Kant says, “he supposes in others the same satisfaction” (CJ,
p. 47) that he experiences in himself. The person attributing beauty to
a work of art “promises himself the agreement of everyone” (CJ, p. 51);
even more strongly, “he demands it of them” (CJ, p. 47).
Aesthetic disputes arise when others rebuff this demand for assent.
Kant pictures one common response to the conflict that results. The
person claiming something is beautiful “blames them if they judge otherwise and he denies them taste, which he nevertheless requires from
them” (CJ, p. 47). Another familiar possibility is that the disputants agree
to disagree and make peace by avoiding the subject. Both responses stop
discussion before it gets started, the one by disqualifying the dissenter
from participating, the other by leaving the dispute unresolved. The
take-it-or-leave-it response resembles the sectarian refusal to count the
other worthy of dialogue (because lacking taste). The to-each-his-own
response minimizes differences in aesthetic judgment instead of taking
them seriously enough to debate them. From this point of view, there is
apparently no way to dispute taste, but also no need to do so. Different
judgments can proliferate and peacefully coexist because nothing is at
stake in resolving their differences. Other opinions, at least about works
of art, neither threaten nor enrich my own.
Some comments by Ted Cohen explore the rich middle ground
between these two extremes.9 In the response to aesthetic disagreement
that interests Cohen, when I differ with you about a work of art, “I am
entitled to my feeling, but I am not justified in thinking yours illegitimate, and, further, I must somehow incorporate your sensibility in my
sense of things” (“SC,” p. 156). Cohen’s example is the music of Wagner,
which he dislikes but others love—Cohen mentions Thomas Mann,
W. H. Auden, and Arturo Toscanini. I can think of many reasons why
Cohen feels that he must somehow incorporate these contrary opinions
into his own “sense of things”: he respects the overall judgment of Mann
and the others, even though he disagrees with them about this particular
case; he feels that music allows for different legitimate responses; he
believes that thinking about these different responses to Wagner could
help him clarify or even reconsider his own.
Cohen, however, arrives at an even more striking reason for caring
why someone else loves a composer he dislikes:
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My world is one in which the music of Wagner is distasteful. Your world
is one in which the music of Wagner is endlessly engaging. I have to
find room in my world for you and your Wagner along with me and my
Wagner. If I don’t, then I forfeit my claim to human, moral responsibility,
for it comes with an obligation not to write you off, not to consign you
to some other world I have nothing to do with. It has to mean something
in my world that you are in it loving Wagner, for, after all, the world is no
more mine than yours. (“SC,” p. 158)

This resolution differs from a classic political compromise because I
do not (yet) see any action that results. Nevertheless, Cohen’s conclusion recalls what I said that sanguine compromises are sanguine about:
sharing the world with people whose views differ from our own and
benefiting from disagreement, not resenting it.
Cohen goes on to consider moral and political disagreements where
urgent decisions are more clearly at stake and something has to be
done. His example is the bitter debate over the permissibility of abortion. I would argue that working through the aesthetic debate over
Wagner puts one in a better position to approach these other disputes.
I do not automatically say that moral and political conflicts are more
difficult than aesthetic disagreements. After all, as Cohen points out,
for people who care about music, “it is not really all that easy for the
Wagner-lovers and the Wagner-haters to share a musical world” (“SC,”
p. 160). But learning to share that world—in this case learning to share
it by taking seriously someone else’s opposite view of a work of art—is,
as Cohen notes, “exactly what has to be done unless our conversation is
to end and we are to be resigned, truly, to being in a war of all against
all” (“SC,” p. 160). From learning to share the world, I think a cascade
of good will can result that won’t by itself guarantee collaboration, but
could predispose us more favorably toward it. If distrust can ramify and
compound, so can generosity.
A comment by Walter Isaacson encapsulates what is at stake in compromise: “Knowing when to stand firm on principle or when to find
common ground with your fellows is the most important, and also the
most difficult, activity in a democracy.”10 It is the most important activity
because knowing when to compromise makes good on our otherwise
abstract commitment to democratic values. As Margalit observes, “We
should, I believe, be judged by our compromises more than by ideals
and norms. Ideals may tell us something important about what we would
like to be. But compromises tell us who we are” (p. 5). Knowing when
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to compromise and when to stand firm is the most difficult activity
because it requires complex judgments that are always vulnerable to
second-guessing, disappointment, and uncertainty.
I have suggested that our engagement with literature and the other
arts, whether reading Homer or debating Wagner, can reinforce our
willingness to share the world, which at once is confirmed by, and results
from, compromise. Individuals thinking through what they care about,
listening and responding to other points of view, sorting out when to
bargain with their adversaries and when to fight or flee, finding their
footing in the different communities and relationships that involve
them—these experiences inform great literature and lively aesthetic
disagreements. They also enable robust democratic decision-making.
Trinity University
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